From Traditional Clientelism to Machine Politics: the Impact of PASOK Populism in Greece

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Research on the transformations of party clientelism in Greece since 1974 focused on jobs and careers and included four case studies of particular organizations and two local studies of contrasting areas, in the Peloponnesus and in Macedonia. It shows that PASOK’s accession to power in 1981 brought with it a quantum leap in party patronage, and the transformation of traditional clientelism into machine politics. The Greek experience exemplifies a process whereby meritocracy is swept away by populism in the context of democratization.

Clientelism has been a central structural feature of modern Greek politics, from even before Independence. Ever since then, efforts to curb the dysfunctions and inequities created by clientelism have been an essential, even inescapable, part of every modernization project (including the one promoted by the actual Simitis government).

Such efforts have naturally centred on the qualifications, appointment, and tenure of civil servants. Trikoupis dismally failed in this area. ‘Down with qualifications!’ even became a rallying cry against him, contributing to his final electoral defeat in 1895. What proved impossible throughout the nineteenth century – the creation of a proper civil service – was achieved only after 1910 under Venizelos and the Liberals. Nevertheless, this achievement was subsequently undermined by the National Schism beginning in 1915, which was to provoke successive wholesale dismissals and appointments of civil servants for

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partisan reasons. Civil war in the 1940s was to have a similar effect on an even bigger scale and for a longer period.

On the eve of the last dictatorship (1967–74), clientelism still appeared to constitute the single most significant aspect of Greek politics. Political science analysis served to propagate this view (Legg 1969), thereby also serving the propaganda of the military against the ‘corrupt’ parliamentary regime which they had overthrown.

The return to democracy in 1974 signified a radical break with the past in many critical respects. Not so with respect to clientelism, however; on the contrary, the concept was taken from social science and popularized in everyday political discourse. Routine denunciations of ‘clientelism’ became commonplace, as if nothing had changed. Nevertheless, there have been important changes in both quantitative and qualitative terms, as our research shows.

TRADITIONAL CLIENTELISM AND MACHINE POLITICS

To understand these changes, a key conceptual distinction is required at the outset (see Mavrogordatos 1983: 5-13, for a more extensive discussion). It was originally made long ago (Weingrod 1968), but has since been lost and forgotten as the literature has continued to make increasingly indiscriminate and facile references to ‘clientelism’.

Traditional clientelism refers to interpersonal patron-client relations. Its typical structural element and characteristic building block is the patron-client dyad linking two individuals (or, at most, the two nuclear families that they represent). Out of many such blocks, networks and pyramids are constructed, with individual politicians at their apex.

It should be inappropriate to use the same term, ‘clientelism’, when the role of either client or patron (or both) is no longer occupied by an individual but, instead, by a group, collectivity, or institution. Localism provides ample illustration of the first instance, whenever an entire village or area receives preferential treatment, as a ‘collective client’.

Similarly, a political party may become a ‘collective patron’ if its relationship with voters involves individualized inducements and, in this sense, resembles a patron-client relationship. The crucial difference with traditional clientelism is that the party machine is fundamentally impersonal and its organizational core is a group, not an individual. Consequently, the political loyalty and identification of voters benefits the party as such, rather than individual politicians.

A distinction should be made, therefore, between ‘clientelism’ (reserved for traditional, interpersonal patron-client relations) and some other, ideally different term, such as ‘machine politics’. Since, however,
‘clientelism’ continues to be used in a broader sense, while ‘machine politics’ does not travel well and is rarely used outside its historic American context (Chubb 1981), the term ‘bureaucratic clientelism’ (Lyrantzis 1984) may also serve to make the same distinction. Bureaucratization is indeed a hallmark of machine politics, as will be seen.

RESEARCH STRATEGY

Accordingly, the methods best suited for the empirical study of clientelism are those of social anthropology (for example, White 1980). Once the level of analysis shifts from the local to the national, however, the methods of social anthropology are no longer practicable, while it also becomes problematic whether one can simply generalize from its local and often peculiar case studies. The classical analysis of patron-client relations in Greece (Campbell 1964), for example, was the study of a marginal shepherd community on the way to extinction.

The problem is compounded when ‘clientelism’ (like ‘charisma’ and other social science terms) is appropriated by the mass media and everyday political discourse, becoming a commonplace blanket rationalization for the country’s ills, as in Greece since the return to democracy in 1974. Little specific information can be gleaned from the national press, as our preliminary analysis showed. References to clientelism are frequent, but also vague. Only its most extreme manifestations, often falling under the special heading of nepotism, are normally reported in any detail.

Under the circumstances, interviews about clientelism in general would lead inevitably to the simple reproduction of generalities already commonplace in political debate. Nor can one expect ‘true confessions’, even from mass surveys, given the sensitivity of the subject. Instead, what seemed a far more promising strategy for our research was to delimit its field and focus on particular areas or organizations as case studies. These offered the considerable advantage of being concrete, specific, but also diverse. The focus of the research was also limited to employment and career opportunities. The variety of services provided by clientelism is truly unlimited and thus difficult to apprehend. Jobs are not only specific, but also the single most vital item, as reflected in public opinion.

The purpose of the research was also to differentiate between at least four broad periods of party government: New Democracy (1974–81), PASOK (1981-89), New Democracy (1990–93), and PASOK again since 1993. As it turned out, this choice was absolutely justified.
For each case study, at least five personal interviews were required in order to capture the range of views along party or sometimes generational lines, as well as the diversity of viewpoints and experiences among trade unionists and actual or former administrators (personnel managers in particular). This information was complemented by official documents and press reports which are too numerous to be listed here.

For the purposes of the research (in conducting interviews) but also of the analysis, the opposite of clientelism needed to be defined at the outset. Terms such as ‘legal’, ‘normal’, or ‘regular’ are not appropriate, since each and every such notion can be subverted in fact by clientelist practices. Once the focus was limited to jobs and careers, however, it made sense to adopt the accepted term in everyday political discourse: ‘meritocracy’ (axiokratia), implying a system whereby appointments and career patterns are determined on the basis of merit alone, according to universalistic and objective criteria (cf. Dahl 1989: 56–7).

FOUR CASE STUDIES

The case studies covered four organizations: public secondary education, public telecommunications, the National Bank, and the Piraiki-Patraiki Cotton Manufacturing Company. Sheer size was an obvious criterion for selection. Some 65,000 high school teachers constitute the largest single category of civil servants. The Hellenic Telecommunications Organization (OTE), with 26,000 employees, is the second largest public utility after the Public Power Company (DEI). The National Bank (ETE), with 15,000 employees, has been the largest (initially the only) bank in Greece since its inception. For its part, Piraiki-Patraiki was in its heyday the largest industrial firm in the country.

Apart from size, another obvious criterion was the fact that all four cases have until recently represented some of the most desirable and sought-after careers in the public sector. Consequently, employment in any of them logically should have constituted a prime target of clientelism.

An additional criterion was the expectation that various structural factors must have impeded the free operation of clientelism in each case. Such factors include the system of appointment by seniority peculiar to high school teachers, the special qualifications logically required of OTE and ETE employees, their corresponding corporate ethos, and the requirements of industrial production in Piraiki-Patraiki, as well as those of its eventual re-privatization.

A factor common to all four cases was the presence of strong trade unions. These were expected to serve as an additional and perhaps
insuperable obstacle to clientelism (for reasons to be elaborated below). On the other hand, trade union publications and the diversity of party viewpoints inside the unions promised a wealth of critical information which might not be accessible otherwise. Unlike the first (on the role of trade unions), this last expectation was fortunately borne out in the course of our research. It helped bypass the striking reticence or outright refusal of administrators to divulge what should be public information, given the public ownership of these organizations.

Public Secondary Education

Although a branch of the Greek civil service, public secondary education was set apart until recently by a unique system of recruitment, which appeared to be impermeable to clientelism. University graduates were automatically appointed as high school teachers in chronological order according to the date of their application to the Ministry of Education, which makes appointments nationwide. Grades or other qualifications were immaterial. Only those with a grade average of more than 8.5 (out of 10) or with postgraduate diplomas enjoyed a limited advantage: they took precedence over other applicants of the same year – but not over those of previous years still awaiting appointment. Although objective, this absurd system, whereby the best applicant of 1995 came after the worst of 1994 (or even 1984!) was anything but meritocratic, and was generally recognized as a major source of the deterioration of public education. Nevertheless, most high school teachers and their powerful federation (OLME) considered it sacrosanct, immutable and non-negotiable.

Almost all our respondents thought that ‘it has always been so’. In fact, this system of an annual list was instituted by the dictatorship in 1970 (Legislative Decree No. 651/1970), perhaps in imitation of the army list. Originally, the applicants of the same year were at least ranked on the list according to their grade average. Even this disappeared when the system was retained by New Democracy (Law 309/1976) and eventually by PASOK as well (Law 1566/1985).

Before 1970, practically all applicants could expect to be appointed within a matter of months. By 1970, however, the number of graduates was already exceeding the number of positions to be filled each year. Fuelled by the haphazard inflation of higher education, this gap between graduates and job opportunities has continued to widen ever since, until it reached catastrophic proportions: in some subjects, the graduates on the list would never be appointed.

However absurd, this system effectively ruled out clientelism in the allocation of permanent jobs. Nevertheless, clientelism thrived in the
allocation of temporary (yearly) jobs: in the appointment of substitutes (where the list could be easily circumvented locally) and, especially, in the employment of high school teachers by the hour (where the list was not binding). Substitutes represent as much as 15 per cent of the teaching body, while those paid by the hour account for less than 2 per cent.

Similarly, the process of postings and transfers became objective, according to an elaborate point system. Nevertheless, clientelism is rampant in temporary (yearly) postings (apistos). These used to be approved at the discretion of the Minister of Education. Even after they were mostly entrusted to a permanent commission (the Central Service Council or KYSDE), they continue to be largely under the discretionary control of the party in power, which has an assured majority on that body, including the teachers’ elected representative who belongs to the party. Both under PASOK and under ND, it is through him that at least 60 per cent of applications are approved, according to one estimate.

In a variety of personal situations, these temporary postings represent the only available recourse against the rigidity of the system. It is therefore not surprising that their number should be abnormally high (8 per cent of the permanent teaching body) and that they should constitute the prime matter of clientelism. Although few, postings abroad (to Greek schools or other positions) represent a coveted prize with which loyal party cadres are rewarded.

Also in the case of high-school teachers, the abolition of the pre-existing hierarchy throughout the civil service may be regarded as the single most devastating blow to meritocracy on the part of PASOK after 1981. Until then, the normal course of a successful career would lead to the grade of principal and eventually to the top grade of inspector-general, which formed the traditional leadership of the profession. Since then, there has been in fact no promotion in the usual sense – that is, depending on merit.

Denigrated as arbitrary despots, inspectors-general (300 at the time) were the first to be abolished and retired in one stroke. With the subsequent abolition of other grades, 2,500 principals were effectively demoted. Under PASOK’s new system, all high school teachers automatically advance through three successive grades after a number of years, regardless of ability or performance. The only other permanent grade is school counsellor (a shadow of the old inspector-general in terms of authority). Otherwise, appointment to any of four administrative positions is only for a four-year term.

If there is no promotion in the usual sense, there has been also no personnel evaluation in any sense. Identified with the defunct inspectors-general, personnel evaluation became ideologically suspect and in fact
ceased. In the vacuum thereby created, party clientelism operates freely when it comes to the selection of school counsellors and administrators. Under PASOK, the process was effectively monopolized by its party organization in the teachers’ unions (PASKE). When ND returned to power in 1990, it did not dare restore the old grade hierarchy in the face of the established populist mentality. Instead, it proceeded to make its own party selections. When PASOK came back in 1993, it replaced all those in the top two administrative echelons before the expiration of their term. One of our respondents claimed that these positions (on the level of the nome (district) and its territorial subdivisions) are filled exclusively on the basis of party allegiance, while the lower two echelons (school principals and their assistants) to the rate of ‘only’ 60 per cent.

Public Telecommunications (OTE)\textsuperscript{a}

From its inception, the Hellenic Telecommunications Organization (OTE), a state monopoly, could pride itself on the technical expertise of its employees, which was dictated by the very nature of its task. Meritocracy in recruitment was guaranteed by highly competitive examinations, which were regularly held until 1978 for all categories of permanent personnel except the lowest (messengers, guards, cleaning women and unskilled workers). It is therefore mostly in this last category that traditional clientelism could operate. Another area was temporary employment, for which no examinations were required. An upsurge in such clientelistic appointments took place on the eve of the 1981 election, as in other sectors, but did not save ND from electoral defeat.

With PASOK’s accession to power, the situation changed radically. Competitive examinations were simply discontinued. (Only one, for 300 designers, was held in 1983.) Instead, the PASOK management resorted massively to strictly partisan temporary appointments, which increased spectacularly on the eve of the 1985 and 1989 elections. Close to 2,000 such temporary employees had been awarded permanent status by 1988.

Moreover, a new avenue for clientelistic appointments to permanent positions was opened in 1986 by PASOK’s Law 1648 for the compulsory hiring of handicapped persons, veterans, war victims, and members of families with many children (five or more). Given its irresistible humanitarian overtones, it has served ever since to justify new appointments even in public agencies such as OTE that are disastrously overburdened with redundant personnel. They are forced to hire such persons to the rate of 8 per cent of their actual workforce in each nome. No publicity and no competition are required, with the result that beneficiaries of this dispensation are literally handpicked beforehand through mostly party channels. Moreover, they are often not
handicapped at all, but merely certified as such by corrupt and/or partisan medical authorities. Such cases have become notorious as the ‘monkey’ handicapped.

An interesting contrast with PASOK practices is provided by the coalition governments of 1989-90, first between ND and SYN (which then included the KKE), and subsequently between all parties (including PASOK). OTE was then entrusted to a bi-partisan team (SYN and ND). The management’s earlier arbitrary power to make temporary appointments (Article 24a of OTE Regulations) was curtailed, and its PASOK beneficiaries were summarily dismissed. Some 200 jobs in the lowest category were filled on a competitive basis in October 1989. For the first time after seven years (or 13 years if the special case of 1983 is discounted), a competitive examination was announced for 400 technical jobs, which were really and urgently needed – after thousands of unnecessary partisan appointments. First ND and then, most adamantly, PASOK attempted to have the competition postponed indefinitely. It was finally held just before ND won power in the 1990 election. The ND government then used various pretexts to avoid appointing the successful contestants! Half were eventually hired only in 1993, and the other half in 1994 only after winning in the courts.

Otherwise, ND made appointments in OTE sparingly, restrained as it was by its declared objective of privatization. Nonetheless, 220 supposedly handicapped persons were hired within two years. Upon its return to power in 1993, PASOK managed to hire another 100 in just four months. Such appointments are expected to continue, even though OTE has started offering fat bonuses for early retirement (Eleftherotypia, 20 September 1995). Its official objective is to reduce its 26,000 employees to 16,000 by the year 2000. As a result of PASOK practices, less than 40 per cent of the present total have been hired by competitive examination.

With respect to postings and transfers, which used to be at the discretion of management, the OTE regulation adopted in 1985 under pressure from the trade unions, seems to be on the whole applied despite its rigidity.

Like the public high school teachers, OTE employees automatically move through successive grades (eight in this case) after a number of years (17 in total). It is with respect to further promotions that meritocracy has not recovered from the blow it received during PASOK’s first term. Before 1981, promotions were mostly based on merit, despite the parallel influence of clientelism. They were constrained by personnel evaluations and by the rankings on the personnel list based on seniority and qualifications. Determined to promote and reward its own people,
PASOK simply ignored such constraints after 1981. Whereas previously perhaps as many as 25 names would be passed over in a promotion, to pass over 1,000 names (as PASOK immediately did) was absolutely unprecedented. Until 1989, almost all promotions were reserved for PASOK regulars, with minor concessions to the traditional Left. Moreover, beginning in 1985, promotions were no longer linked to corresponding positions, with the result that today as many as 1,900 employees hold the grade for which a mere 500 posts are officially foreseen.

Moved by revanchism and under pressure to redress PASOK injustices, ND after 1990 proceeded in turn to promote almost exclusively its own supporters. Since PASOK returned to power in 1993, it has again kept the lion’s share in promotions, but the other parties also get their (disproportionately smaller) shares. It is only those without any party protection that ‘will never see promotion’, as one of our respondents observed.

Privatization is expected to change all this, although it has involved so far only 18 per cent of OTE stock. Nevertheless, the first international search for a new general manager aborted. The general manager continued to be one originally selected for his past services as PASOK treasurer (and for his acquaintance with Papandreou’s wife), while his two assistants remained active PASKE cadres. Moreover, despite the context of privatization, strictly partisan considerations continue to affect other management decisions as well. The one representative of the employees elected to the board of directors on the ND party ticket was thus recently ‘ordered’ by his party organization (DAKE) to vote against a major contract for new equipment (Eleftherotypia, 19 October 1996).

*The National Bank (ETE)*

Developments in the state-controlled National Bank of Greece (ETE) closely parallel those in OTE, indicating a pattern common to the public sector. The National Bank is the oldest bank in Greece, as well as one of its oldest institutions. Accordingly, its employees formed one of the country’s first bureaucratic elites. Although both the bank’s dominant position and the privileged status of its employees have been continuously eroded ever since, even today a job in the National Bank remains one of the most sought after careers. In 1994, no less than 38,000 applied and 18,000 eventually competed for just 510 positions (To Vima, 4 December 1994).

Before 1981, meritocracy in hiring was guaranteed by highly competitive examinations (including those reserved for the children of employees). It is estimated that 90 per cent of the main personnel in
1981 had been recruited through such examinations. Traditional
clientelism operated mostly through the limited number of temporary
appointments allowed at the discretion of the management. Otherwise,
its reserved area was the far more numerous auxiliary
personnel (messengers, guards, cleaning women, and so on).

PASOK’s rise to power in 1981 inaugurated a new era. A competition
was held in 1983 which was to be the last for more than a decade.
Nevertheless, until 1989, the bank’s main personnel had increased by at
least 30 per cent (and its overall payroll by perhaps as much as 50 per
cent), reaching 16,000. This was due to the operation of strictly partisan
clientelism, mostly through the hiring of superfluous auxiliary or
temporary personnel, which was then massively promoted to higher
and permanent status. After 1986, Law 1648 on the compulsory hiring
of handicapped persons contributed another 520 to the total.

Between 1990–93, under a professional banker appointed by ND,
there was practically a freeze on hiring. Apparently, ND party clientelism
had to content itself with the periodic allocation of temporary jobs to
cleaning women (in two groups or ‘shifts’). On the other hand, the
bank’s new personnel manager (a ND trade-unionist) alluded in 1993
to the need for a re-evaluation of all bank employees who had been hired
over the previous decade without a competitive examination, an
estimated 15,000 in all state banks, of whom 4,500 were in ETE alone
(Eleftherotypia, 2 May 1993). This threat had no sequel, however; it was
perhaps only an expression of impotent frustration and resentment on
the part of those (like himself) who had been hired by such examinations
and owed their careers to meritocracy.

It is now estimated that at least 40 per cent of ETE’s main personnel
has not been recruited by examination, but through clientelistic channels
(mostly promotions of unqualified auxiliary personnel). Compared to
1981, this proportion has increased fourfold. It burdens the bank with
an enormous mass of deadwood. Government sources indicate that ETE,
like all state banks, could function with only half its personnel
(Eleftherotypia, 5 April 1996).

By 1994, after PASOK’s return to power, the need for qualified new
personnel had become obvious if the bank was to hold its ground in an
increasingly competitive environment. Therefore, after 11 years, a
competitive examination became imperative once again. It was held
at the end of 1994 (for 510 positions) under unprecedented safeguards
of fairness and at enormous cost. Only 471 applicants passed the
examination (Eleftherotypia, 21 February 1995).

Nevertheless, this did not spell the end of party clientelism in hiring,
albeit on a limited scale. Even today, the exact numbers on the payroll of
the National Bank remain a well-guarded secret. The government simply refuses to answer such questions in Parliament (Eleftherotypia, 22 February 1996). Opposition trade-unionists in the bank are also in the dark, even if they sit on its board of directors. Since 1981, precise figures were obtained only once, in September 1989, and only thanks to the coalition government (ND and SYN) at that time.

When interviewed, the deputy personnel manager (a top PASKE cadre) declared bluntly that only a court order could force him to divulge such figures. In the personnel office between 1982 and 1989, and again after 1993, he has been for more than a decade the key actor in the operation of PASOK clientelism in the bank. Originally hired by the bank as an unskilled worker, he owes his meteoric rise entirely to his role and power inside the party machine. He thus himself personifies the extreme consequences of PASOK practices on the careers of ETE employees.

Before 1981, careers were largely ruled by objective criteria, although traditional clientelism was also operating through the established hierarchical channels. This state of affairs was preserved under both the governors appointed by ND during the period 1974–81. Under PASOK, however, the pre-existing bureaucratic hierarchy was immediately decapitated, while power shifted to the PASKE faction in the trade union. Transfers and especially postings became strictly partisan, all the more so since the latter predetermine promotions.

Bank employees automatically advance through the first five grades after a number of years (15 in total). The next two grades are also acquired normally by seniority. It is promotion to the top four grades that was effectively monopolized by PASOK after 1981. Personnel evaluation simply became a meaningless routine and, therefore, no longer constrained selection. Instead, the PASKE ticket in trade union elections became ridiculously long (up to 1,500 names for 25 positions) as candidates for promotion rushed to advertise their party allegiance.

Accumulated injustices and resentments exploded under ND after 1990. Consequently, a wave of strictly partisan postings and promotions swept the bank, affecting all its branches. There were reportedly as many as 1,400 changes, compared to a mere 110 under PASOK after 1993. The more appropriate comparison, of course, should be with the previous eight years, during which PASOK created accomplished facts, including some vertiginous ascensions (like that of the deputy personnel manager). Nevertheless, the complaint was voiced by PASOK sources that in the most recent wave of promotions there existed ‘only’ 38 qualified PASOK candidates for 90 top positions, which made it ‘inevitable’ that other parties get their share. Here again, it is those
without any party backing that have no chance of being promoted merely on merit.

*The Piraiki-Patraiki Cotton Manufacturing Company*

The Piraiki-Patraiki Cotton Manufacturing Company, originally founded in 1919, used to be by far the largest industrial firm in Greece in terms of employment, with some 7,200 employees in 1983, and several factories in southern Greece and some islands. Effectively bankrupt, it was taken over by the state in 1984 under PASOK and in 1992 under ND entered the process of (re)privatization in bits and pieces. By the end of 1996, what remained had been up for sale four times, with no result (*Eleftherotypia*, 25 October 1996). The company’s chequered recent history offers a very interesting case, not only because of the passage from private to public ownership (and back), but also because of the operation of clientelism even under private control.

Before 1984, hiring policies were, on the whole, fairly modern and objective (including a battery of tests) except for the systematic preference for natives of Evrytania and Aetolia-Acarnania like the owners themselves (the Katsambas and Stratos families). It is estimated that in 1984 at least one-third of the company’s workforce came from those two *nomes*. Especially in 1977, when Chr. Stratos ran for Parliament on the ND ticket in Aetolia-Acarnania, the company served as a source of personal patronage far more secure than the public sector could ever be for other politicians. Perhaps as many as 400 jobs were offered at the time to people from the *nome*, who were already (or were expected to become) Stratos supporters. Although some might be of a different party persuasion, including communists, this sort of investment (or wager) was part and parcel of traditional clientelism and its flexibility, all the more so since it involved entire families. Nevertheless, what happened in 1977 was unprecedented for the company. 

After 1984, things changed radically. The few vacancies initially created among the company’s management were entirely filled by the PASOK government with party cadres, while power in the company was effectively usurped by the PASOK party organization in the trade unions (PASKE). Trade unions had been effectively suppressed by the former owners until 1982, when they were founded thanks to PASOK’s accession to power. This is probably the key to what was to follow in terms of fanatical partisanship.

On the eve of the 1985 election, as many as 1,000 jobs were supposedly created by the institution of a fourth shift (about half of them in Patras). These were distributed by the unions themselves – that is,
almost exclusively by PASKE. Local PASOK MPs in Patras, as well as the other party organizations (ND and KKE), apparently received minor shares. Soon, however, most of these (and other) party appointments were recognized as redundant: a total of 1,700 according to a confidential report by the management in 1988 (Rizospastis, 4 September 1988). At least 100 employees took advantage of incentives to leave. Nevertheless, more were hired by PASOK before the 1989 election.

PASOK appointments in Piraiki-Patraiki served not only the party’s general electoral needs, but also the particular calculations of PASKE in its pursuit of total control inside the company. In what was probably the most extravagant manifestation of partisanship, 120 to 140 persons were hired for the central offices in 1988 in order to dislodge the elected representative of the employees on the board of directors, who was a communist. In the next election for that position, the PASKE candidate was duly elected. It is worth noting in this connection that, even in 1986, half the personnel of the central offices was considered redundant (Rizospastis, 18 September 1986).

By 1990, under the ND government, party clientelism began to operate ‘in reverse’: that is, in selective dismissals. Almost immediately, some 800 employees were dismissed, mostly chosen among those hired in 1985 – in other words among PASOK (and KKE) supporters. Once the company entered the process of liquidation in 1992, under ND’s legislation on privatization (Law 2000/1992), all its remaining 4,500 employees were dismissed. Among those who were re-employed (some 300) about half were apparently selected on objective grounds, the rest on a partisan basis (mostly ND). Finally, the new PASOK government in December 1993 proceeded to dismiss some 120 ND supporters and re-employ 50 of its own, including a few who had previously cashed fat bonuses to leave. The statement issued by PASKE on this occasion (Open Letter, 6 December 1993) is a monument to the prevailing spirit of vindictiveness: it bids ‘farewell’ not only to the eponymous managers, but also to the anonymous ND supporter!

Inside the company, meritocracy has always been a problem with respect to white-collar rather than blue-collar workers. Personnel management before 1984 ostensibly operated according to a merit system, although one that was to some extent distorted by the preferential treatment of ND supporters from Aetolia-Acarnania. The accumulated resentment of the others, identified with PASOK and KKE, exploded after 1984, when the trade unions dominated by PASKE pressed for the redress of past injustices. The yearly personnel evaluation was simply abolished as an oppressive mechanism of the former owners.
An integrated pay structure was adopted, which was simply based on length of employment with the company. Accordingly, performance was henceforth irrelevant, while cleaning women might receive more pay than managers. Party clientelism further aggravated the company’s predicament, resulting in an overgrown parasitic bureaucracy three times the size of the blue-collar work force. Despite the ostensible consensus of all party groups, successive plans of rationalization were aborted by the resistance of those affected, who simply refused to recognize any hierarchy based on merit.

The limited experience of those parts of the old company that are already privatized indicates that clientelism has effectively ceased to operate. A probable exception is the factory in Karpenissi, taken over by the former owners and situated in a single-member electoral district represented until recently by Dora Bakoyanni, the influential daughter of former prime minister Mitsotakis. According to a PASOK source, ‘it is the same old story all over again.’

TWO LOCAL STUDIES

Our research was complemented by two local studies. Two towns were selected for that purpose, providing a sharp and multifaceted contrast. One is the centre of an agricultural, depopulated, and very conservative nome of the Peloponnesus, which has been the foremost stronghold of ND since 1974. The other is an industrial town of Macedonia, dominated by the Public Power Company (DEI) and its power plants (employing locally almost one-third of its national total of 30,000), as well as other state-owned industries. In parliamentary elections since 1974, the nome has returned the same majority as that obtained nationally. Some twenty interviews were conducted in each town, not only with people prominent in local politics, but also with ordinary citizens.

During the period 1974–81, under ND, both areas exhibited all the characteristics of traditional clientelism described elsewhere (Mavrogordatos 1983: 67–75). Patron-client relations formed pyramids, with MPs or other politicians (politeftes) at their peak, local party bosses (kommatarches) in the middle, and individual voters at the base. The situation was aptly defined as vouleptokratia (‘rule of the MPs’) by many respondents. In the absence of effective party organization and mass membership, MPs even nominated the ND party committee for the nome, and could always count upon the cooperation of the government’s appointed representative (nomarchis or prefect). Opportunities for clientelist appointments in the public sector
were relatively few, especially in the first town, and mostly concerned the
armed forces and the security services. In the second town, however,
there were expanding opportunities in DEI and other state industries,
involving not only jobs, but also the assignment of public contracts. A
characteristic of traditional clientelism on which many respondents
insisted was the absence of sectarianism. One did not have to be a ND
member or voter to get a public job or receive other services from ND
politicians.

Things changed dramatically after PASOK came to power in 1981.
Organized along ‘Marxist-Leninist lines’ according to PASOK
respondents, the party machine became all-powerful. It had even
selected the MPs to be elected, by concentrating preference votes
accordingly (a standard communist practice). In the new kind of party
clientelism, the PASOK party committee for the nome became the actual
centre of power with which both the MPs and the prefect had to co-
operate. An explicit ‘quota-system’ (posostosi) was instituted (both
nationally and locally), whereby appointments in the public sector were
to be equally shared between the party machine and the MPs.

Concerning such appointments, it was formally decided from the
outset that they would be subject to approval by the party machine and
that PASOK members would have absolute priority. A special ‘solidarity
department’ was even set up inside the party organization (both
nationally and locally) to process their demands. Consequently, party
membership increased spectacularly (it doubled nationwide).
The rationalization offered for these strictly partisan appointments was
that ‘progressives’ had been excluded by the Right for forty years. After
1985, however, during PASOK’s second term, the prevailing
rationalization was different: priority was supposedly given to those in
need.

In the first town, the numbers involved were relatively small.
Although some state services were expanded and new ones were created
(like ‘Popular Education’), the public sector perforce remained limited,
given the absence of economic development in the area. Not so in the
second town, where DEI and three state industries offered
opportunities which initially appeared unlimited. As one of
our respondents recalled, in 1981 ‘it was truly amazing how all the
“progressive” people, whether PASOK voters or not, were simply sure
that the DEI gates would open to accept everyone.’

Until then, DEI had recruited its permanent technical and
administrative personnel by competitive examination (partly through its
own training schools). Traditional clientelism had operated mostly on
the lowest level (such as unskilled workers, messengers and cleaning
women), for which no competition was required. The last major competitive examinations under ND were held in 1978 (for 600 jobs) and 1981 (for 300 jobs). Although held on the eve of the election that the ND government under G. Rallis was to lose, the latter competition proved to be the most meritocratic in local DEI history.

PASOK initially introduced a system of massive temporary employment in DEI, but in 1983 proceeded to hire almost 3,000 permanent employees after a fake oral examination, which was actually organized by the nome’s party committee, as even PASOK respondents admit. The jobs, including the 40 per cent quota allotted to MPs, were apportioned among the various local party branches in the nome. Thereafter, the party machine continued to distribute jobs in DEI, either by controlling the entrance to its training schools, or by offering temporary employment which led to permanent status. After 1986, it also exploited Law 1648 (on the ‘handicapped’), providing several hundred additional permanent jobs. The numerous private contractors working for DEI were also required to hire only those selected by the party.

Apart from DEI, the PASOK party machine also made massive appointments to the area’s three state industries, whose workforce almost tripled: from 800 before 1981, it had reached 2,200 by 1989. Consequently, after 1990 (under ND) one went bankrupt, another was privatized, and the third had to make drastic cuts. Only about 400 jobs survive. In the firm that eventually went bankrupt and in local government, PASOK collaborated with the KKE, and jobs were to be apportioned according to the electoral strength of each. Violations of this agreement on the part of the Communists, to the benefit of their own members, produced frequent and bitter conflicts.

By the time ND returned to power in 1990, it had come to resemble PASOK. A mass party organization had developed, in which MPs had to share appointments according to a ‘quota system’ (albeit more favourable to them than in the case of PASOK). Emulating PASOK, the ND party machine proceeded to hire through fake examinations 1,100 permanent DEI employees in 1991, and another 600 in 1992 (through entrance to the training school). In addition, some 1,000 temporary DEI employees were hired locally (4,500 nationally), and were awarded permanent status in 1993, just before the fall of the ND government. These employees were subsequently dismissed by the new PASOK government, but eventually won in the courts. In the meantime, however, PASOK had hired another 500, and refused to abide by the court decision, invoking DEI’s financial burden.
FROM TRADITIONAL CLIENTELISM TO MACHINE POLITICS

There can be no doubt whatsoever that PASOK’s accession to power in 1981 brought with it a quantum leap in party clientelism. Both our case studies and our local studies confirm what was, by all accounts, a spectacular increase in the number of public jobs and positions filled through party channels. This involved not only the massive addition of new personnel to existing public bureaucracies, but also the creation and staffing of new and sometimes ill-defined agencies, such as the notorious ‘Popular Education’ which was in effect a thin disguise for a nationwide network of party activists posing as state employees.  

For this quantum leap in party clientelism, no better or simpler proof is required than the abrupt cessation of competitive examinations. Prior to 1981, recruitment to highly desirable careers in the public sector was by regularly conducted competitive examinations. After 1982 or 1983 at the latest, this process simply ceased altogether, although appointments soared. In other words, several thousand positions which would have previously required a competitive examination were simply filled without such an examination.

The change was not only quantitative, but also qualitative. Traditional clientelism was suddenly replaced by a new type, which was massive, impersonal, bureaucratic, and sectarian. Individual patrons were supplanted by the party machine, and traditional clientelism by ‘machine politics’ (or, alternatively, ‘bureaucratic clientelism’).

The change was qualitative in another respect as well. Prior to 1981, and irrespective of the actual numbers involved, traditional clientelism operated on the margins of what was essentially a merit system, however imperfect. A ‘hard core’ of meritocracy involved most permanent jobs (for which a competitive examination was normally required) and the bulk of bureaucratic promotions. Clientelism knew no constraints only on the margins, both lower and upper: unskilled permanent jobs, temporary appointments, transfers and postings, but also top-level promotions. PASOK did not merely expand this dual system, but proceeded to destroy the very core of meritocracy, with the elimination of both competitive examinations and personnel evaluation.

PASOK respondents and sympathizers now tend to rationalize their party (and often also personal) record by reflecting that ‘it has always been like that’. There are, however, two additional arguments against such rationalizations.

First, at least in the period 1974–81, no one of merit was a priori excluded – popular myths to the contrary notwithstanding. Some who were active communists at the time characteristically recall their surprise
at being appointed simply thanks to their success in the hiring competition, despite their political (or even police) record. Second, after 1981, there was a massive influx of personnel that was both superfluous and unqualified, as all recognize today.

In other words, the new type of party clientelism introduced by PASOK essentially served only those who could never hope to gain access under any merit system. Therefore, an interpretation can be grounded only in the peculiar logic and dynamic of populism, within the broader context of democratization.

MERITOCRACY AND DEMOCRATIZATION

Any merit system is by definition undemocratic in certain aspects. However limited its sphere of application may be, meritocracy creates a reserved area from which democratic egalitarianism is by definition excluded.

It may be recalled that in Athenian democracy the effective form of this egalitarianism was selection by lot (cf. Aristotle, Politics, IV, 1294b). In modern times, the most telling and well-known experience is that of the United States before a proper civil service could be consolidated. With reference to the American experience, it has been observed pointedly that 'the true cause for the introduction of the spoils system was the triumph of democracy' (Fish 1905: 156). It is therefore not surprising that the experience of modern Greece should parallel that of the USA. The two countries were the first to adopt universal (male) suffrage, long before a 'constituency for bureaucratic autonomy' (Shefter 1977) could materialize.

Meritocracy inevitably implies what is essentially an oligarchy. Although based solely on personal merit, it remains an oligarchy nonetheless. Personal merit, of course, may also be valued and rewarded in democracy. Even so, meritocracy implies oligarchy at least insofar as it entrusts any selection process based on merit to 'experts' (themselves selected accordingly) rather than to the citizens or their representatives.

The tension between meritocracy and democracy can be expected to become most acute during the phase of democratization following the demise of an authoritarian regime, as in Greece after 1974. The most obvious but also most transitory aspect typically involves supporters and opponents of the previous regime. Irrespective of merit, the former may be purged and the latter may be rewarded or at least rehabilitated. Other aspects, however, have both far-reaching and long-lasting consequences. If the previous regime ostensibly maintained a merit system, the rampant and blatant nepotism and favouritism typical of
such regimes may have undermined the credibility and the legitimacy of the merit system as such. In the charged context of democratization, meritocracy may thus be regarded as not just undemocratic, but also (and worse) as an authoritarian fraud. Meritocracy may even be swept away if the pressure for democratization crystallizes into an eventually victorious populist movement, such as PASOK.³

POPULISM AND MACHINE POLITICS

Pitting the many against the privileged few in truly Manichaean fashion, and moved by the most elemental egalitarianism, populism tends to deny the legitimacy of any entrenched elite, however recruited. In the populist view, the very existence of elites and hierarchies smacks of oligarchy and embodies an intolerable injustice against ‘The People’. Any ‘oligarchy’ is to be immediately destroyed, and accumulated past injustices are to be redressed at any cost.

Although only past criteria of recruitment (or promotion) may be denounced explicitly as inequitable and fraudulent, it is actually the principle of selection itself and the very notion of merit that provoke suspicion and hostility. Any selection process (except by lot, as in ancient Athens) inevitably separates and elevates a few among the many. Even if these few are truly the best, their selection is still regarded as a breach of egalitarianism. Even if stemming from natural talent, merit is no less regarded as a privilege by those lacking it. Accordingly, populism seeks to displace or even replace merit by other objective criteria, such as need or social injustice however construed, as in the ‘point system’ introduced by PASOK in Greece (Law 1320/1982).

The most devastating implication of populism for meritocracy, however, is the neutralization of the natural guardians of any merit system: those previously recruited by it, imbued with its values, and having a vested interest in its perpetuation. For populism, any hierarchy is by definition suspect – all the more so, if it is a self-perpetuating hierarchy, like the one produced by meritocracy. Bureaucratic superiors are not to be trusted in matters of hiring or promotion. As products of the ‘system’ they are bound to perpetuate its ‘abuses’. Populism may even decapitate the existing hierarchy by abolishing top bureaucratic posts altogether, as PASOK did with inspectors-general in public education (and general directors throughout the civil service). Short of that, populism may simply entrust the selection process to its own political appointees, as spokesmen for ‘The People’.

In a variety of ways, therefore, populism proceeds to dismantle the pre-existing merit system: competitive examinations are no longer held,
criteria are changed or subverted, superiors are no longer empowered to evaluate subordinates, and personnel evaluation itself practically ceases. A vacuum is thus created, in which party clientelism of a new kind can flourish without legal impediments. It is unprecedented in scale, since it no longer operates on the margins of a merit system, but in effect replaces it. It is massive also because traditional individual patrons (whether insiders or outsiders) are supplanted by the populist party machine acting as a collective patron. Hence, it is an essentially impersonal and bureaucratic process, most aptly defined as machine politics (or else as ‘bureaucratic clientelism’). Unlike traditional clientelism, it is also inflexible and sectarian, based on a primary distinction between ‘friend’ and ‘foe’.

The perfect illustration of these features of machine politics under PASOK comes from an unlikely area – the Greek universities. In September 1986, D. Kladis, newly appointed Secretary-General of the Ministry of Education, sent through the official mail a circular to the principal PASOK cadres in the various universities (Eleftherotypia, 4 October 1986). It was entitled ‘Utilization of Trusted Personnel’ and contained an exhaustive list of all the positions (codified for convenience) to which the Ministry is entitled by law to appoint at its discretion selected university professors. These positions include: representation abroad (EU, OECD, UNESCO, and so on), the administration of new universities, the administration of various state agencies under the purview of the Ministry, examination boards of various kinds (such as for state scholarships), bodies appointed for the selection of university faculty, for the evaluation of personnel or textbooks of elementary and secondary education, and so on. The list included even the commission to write such textbooks!

Recipients of the circular were instructed to compile and send two lists of professors in their university: List A with all the party members, and List B with selected party ‘friends’. The appropriate code would help designate the desired positions. The existence and mailing of this circular was never denied; the Minister of Education, A. Tritsis, merely kept repeating that it was not an official state document (as if that was the issue). As for its author, he ended up teaching ‘University Administration’ in a peripheral university.

Apart from the bureaucratic and sectarian mentality of the PASOK machine, the Kladis case also exemplifies the fusion of administrative and party functions that has been typical of PASOK rule to this day. The consequences were bound to be even more devastating when this anomalous fusion involved not only administrative and party functions, but also trade union functions as well.
TRADE UNIONS AS TROJAN HORSES

In principle, one would expect trade unions to serve, if not as guardians of meritocracy, at least as bulwarks against party clientelism. There are at least two interrelated but distinct reasons for such a theoretical expectation. The ethos of solidarity peculiar to trade unions implies the acceptance of only impersonal and objective criteria, while being intrinsically imical to preferential treatment on personal grounds. Moreover, individuals recruited and/or promoted through clientelist channels will never develop an adequate degree of loyalty to the union, at the expense of its effectiveness, if not its very survival. This point was best illustrated by one of our respondents in ETE with an extreme example: the union would strike demanding permanent status for temporary employees (those owing their jobs to clientelism), yet these, once permanent, would serve as habitual strike-breakers.

Far from conforming to our theoretical expectation, trade unions in Greece have served as Trojan Horses of PASOK populism and clientelism instead. This is due primarily to their complete penetration or even substitution by the corresponding specialized party organizations. The process was spearheaded by PASOK’s own organization (PASKE) and perpetuated by PASOK legislation imposing proportional representation (PR) as the compulsory electoral system in trade union elections.

Whether through the official trade union or by itself, PASKE not only demanded and legitimized ‘in the name of the working class’ the dismantling of meritocracy, but also was its main beneficiary as an organization, since it usurped the power of the official hierarchy and became itself the principal party machine through which the new kind of clientelism operated (cf. Kioulafas 1991: 49,110). It was even considered normal for PASKE cadres, that is active unionists, to take over personnel management themselves. In some cases, even PASOK ministers and MPs were effectively marginalized. Subsequently, as the initial collective impetus subsided, PASKE unionists were to evolve into individual patrons with their personal clienteles and aspirations to a parliamentary career.

The contrast with Portugal, as reported by Fernando Farelo Lopes (in this issue), is indeed striking and requires further explanation. In Portugal, as in other southern European countries, party divisions have led to separate and competing trade unions, each of which is allowed to preserve its cohesion. This is not the case in Greece, where there exists formally a single official trade union structure. In the very few cases (such as Austria), where elections in such a single structure are contested
by party lists under PR, one party (the SPÖ in Austria) is nonetheless assured of a large, stable, and uncontested majority. Continuity and cohesion of the trade unions are thereby safeguarded. In sharp contrast, Greek trade unions have become an empty shell, within which at least three major parties (PASOK, ND, and KKE) compete for control, in constantly shifting coalitions and combinations. As I have argued more extensively elsewhere, this is a peculiarity unique to the Greek trade unions after 1982, when PR was forced upon them (Mavrogordatos 1993).

Again, only populism can provide the key to an interpretation of the situation in Greece. Its consequences for trade unions, and the particular nexus between populism, trade unions, and machine politics are best illustrated by the experience of Argentina under Peronism – the archetype of populism in power (Baily 1967; James 1988). This is the most apt comparison for the Greek experience under PASOK (Mavrogordatos 1993). It is precisely through the trade unions that populism and machine politics also infected other political parties, and especially ND.

THE CONTAGION OF MACHINE POLITICS

A fatal political weakness of meritocracy is that its potential immediate beneficiaries (in terms of jobs and careers) are by definition fewer than those of clientelism. It is in the light of this unpleasant truth that the contagion of ND by machine politics after 1981 can be understood. Under Averof, and especially under Mitsotakis, the party openly chose to meet PASOK on its own ground and with its own weapons.

This applies especially to the party organization in the trade unions (DAKE), founded in 1985. ND is indeed the only example of a liberal-conservative party (as opposed to a Christian-democratic one) that has specialized party organizations and nominates party tickets in trade unions and all other interest groups. It is also the only such party that effectively subscribes to the (in)famous Leninist conception of trade unions as ‘transmission belts’!

Among public employees, ND had a natural constituency, especially after 1981: those previously recruited under the merit system, imbued with its values, and having a vested interest in its preservation. For them, the PASOK experience proved immediately and even personally traumatic, since both their past achievements and their future career prospects were brutally cancelled, and they were also often persecuted and humiliated by their former subordinates.
Such people formed the initial hard core of DAKE. Anger and bitterness still surface in their interviews, but these feelings are also directed against their own party, which proved unwilling, after 1990, simply to roll back the accomplished facts created by PASOK. Their own radical proposals were ignored as being too costly in political terms. One such proposal was the gradual restoration of the civil service ranks (at least in public education). Another, already mentioned, was the re-evaluation of all the employees of state-controlled banks who had not been hired by competitive examination.

After eight years of PASOK rule, however, restoration of the old order in the civil service and in the public sector generally proved impossible on both practical and political grounds. Simply put, it would certainly alienate many more than it would satisfy. As a safer and less costly course, ND chose instead to emulate PASOK’s machine politics and simply reward its own partisans, although within far more stringent financial constraints.

A structural key to this development is provided by the peculiarity of Greek trade unions. Party competition inside the unions rules out a real confrontation between the government and the unions as such. As long as a party continues to nominate candidates in union elections, its policy is bound to be affected by such electoral calculations, especially for the benefit of its own unionists. In the recent Fourth Congress of ND, the proportion of trade unionists exceeded 11 per cent (Eleftherotypia, 22 March 1997).

On the other hand, party competition inside the unions also rules out the emergence of an effective movement for meritocracy in their midst. Its potential supporters are divided by their party allegiance or otherwise neutralized by a sense of helplessness and disgust with party politics. Our interviews indicate that such a movement would have required an improbable timely alliance between some conservatives, some communists, and many apolitical, if not passive, public employees. Today, all these readily agree that a substantial degree of meritocracy existed in their respective workplaces prior to PASOK, but they were obviously ill-prepared to join forces and defend it in time.

PUTTING THE PIECES TOGETHER AGAIN

Meritocracy is unfortunately like Humpty Dumpty: once it has fallen, it is hard to put the pieces together again. By 1994, it had become obvious even to A. Papandreou that the enormous waste in human and material resources required by machine politics over the previous decade could no longer continue, if only because of financial constraints, including
those imposed by EU membership. The restoration of some kind of merit system became imperative. Under his successor C. Simitis, this has become an urgent priority of the new PASOK government, while the notorious ‘solidarity departments’ inside the party have disappeared.

The only system that seems to inspire confidence by now is limited to written examinations, modelled after those required for access to public higher education. This is indeed the new system for recruitment into the civil service inaugurated by Law 2190/1994, which was first implemented in April 1995. No fewer than 107,245 originally applied and 48,948 eventually competed for just 3075 positions. Initially, however, only 1803 positions were actually filled (Eleftherotypia, 5 August 1995).

Far from instituting an unadulterated merit system, the law originally provided for its ‘correction’ according to a point system based on need, including the (inevitable) number of children. For the upper three categories of the civil service (with higher, technical or only secondary education), for which written examinations are required, the grades received were incremented accordingly. In the first competition, those who owed their success and appointment to such increments amounted to 35 per cent, 31 per cent, and 42 per cent respectively (Eleftherotypia, 5 August 1995). For the lowest category (with only elementary education), no objective test of any kind was apparently considered proper or necessary. They are to be recruited exclusively by the point system. The consequences were illustrated ad absurdum in the case of the Fire Brigade. Family men with several children were given preference as firemen over their single (and presumably younger) counterparts (Eleftherotypia, 2 October 1996).

The new law also involves enormous rigidity. The written examinations are so cumbersome and costly that they can be held only once every two years. Moreover, the law leaves out a variety of special categories, for which such general and infrequent written examinations are simply not appropriate. This is especially true of temporary employment, which, as we have seen, constitutes the prime matter of clientelism. It is also true of cases where an interview is imperative. The concept of an oral interview has been totally discredited by PASOK and ND abuses. This adds to the rigidity in hiring, while it also affects the problem of meritocracy in promotions.

Nonetheless, Law 2190 has had far-reaching implications simply by virtue of the fact that it created the equivalent of a Civil Service Commission, named the Supreme Council of Personnel Selection (ASEP). In the changed political conditions since 1994 and amidst widespread exasperation with party clientelism, this new body has
MACHINE POLITICS IN GREECE

devolved a dynamic of its own, and has aggressively promoted itself as the overall watchdog over hiring practices in the public sector. At the time of writing, the Simitis government appears determined to consolidate and extend the merit system contained in Law 2190 to the entire public sector, including state controlled banks, despite the resistance of its own trade unionists. A point system will no longer alter the outcome of written examinations (although a quota will still be reserved for those with large families). The law will also apply to elementary and secondary public education. Moreover, the continuous evaluation of teachers is back, including a special inspectorate for that purpose. Although the teachers’ unions vociferously denounced these reforms as a return to the past, they were no doubt required for the future.

NOTES

1. For a landmark analysis of patron-client networks before, during, and after the War of Independence, see Petropulos (1968).
2. This case study was based on interviews with a specialist on Greek education and four actual or former trade unionists from all parties, including an elected representative of the teachers on the Central Service Council or KYSDE. There was also ample documentation, including the bulletin and other publications of the Federation of High-School Teachers (OLME). Also, Tsountas and Chronopoulou (1995).
3. Public elementary education had a similar system.
4. This case study was based on interviews with a former general manager, an employee of the personnel office, and three trade unionists, including the actual personnel manager. All shades of party opinion were represented. In addition, official documents and press reports were also useful. Also Kioulafas (1991).
5. This case study was based on interviews with five trade unionists, including the actual deputy personnel manager, a former personnel manager, and two elected representatives of the employees on the bank’s board of directors. Printed sources included the periodical published by the bank’s trade union since 1934 (Trapezitiki) and the specialized independent monthly Trapeziko Vima.
6. This case study was based on interviews with an employee of the personnel office, and four actual or former trade-unionists, including a former personnel manager. All shades of party opinion were represented. Press reports were complemented by the trade-union’s own monthly (Apopseis).
7. This is probably why Piraiki-Patraiki is not even mentioned in an otherwise thorough study of clientelism in Aetolia-Acarnania (and Kavala) before 1967 (Komninos 1984).
8. See, for example, Chamber of Deputies, 18 November 1986, p.1146.

REFERENCES


